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INTRODUCTION

One goal of tax policy is to provide uniform and definite consequences to particular economic events. To accomplish this goal, the
tax system must tax substantially equivalent transactions in the same
fashion. Agreement generally exists that the two types of corporate
acquisitions, stock acquisitions and asset acquisitions, merely represent alternative legal techniques for accomplishing the same economic
result, and thus are far too similar to justify different tax results.
Tax experts, however, do not agree on the proper method for taxing
corporate acquisitions.'
One suggested pattern for uniformly taxing acquisitions is to require immediate recognition of the corporate level gain. In other
words, a system which requires a mandatory section 338 "election"
for qualified stock purchases. 2 Critics of a mandatory section 338 system argue that its implementation is unworkable. 3 The purpose of this
article is to analyze the implementation of a mandatory section 338
system for taxable acquisitions 4 so that Congress can properly weigh

See infra text accompanying notes 41-73. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
1-75 (1982) [hereinafter ALI PROPOSAL]
(proposal allowing affected corporations to make carryover basis elections in qualified asset
acquisitions and to make cost basis elections in qualified stock purchases); Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposalfor Mandatory Uniform Rules, 44 TAX L. REV. 145 (1989)
(proposal requiring a carryover basis and deferral of the corporate level gain for qualified asset
acquisitions); Lewis, A Proposalfor a Corporate Level Tax on Major Stock Sales, 37 TAX
NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 1041 (Dec. 7, 1987) (proposal for requiring immediate imposition of a
corporate level tax for qualified stock purchases); Thigpen, Section 338 and Afterwards: Rethinking One-Level Treatment qf the Sale of the Business, 2 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 173 (1983) (analysis
of I.R.C. § 338 prior to the repeal of General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S.
200 (1935)); Yin, A Carryover Basis Asset Acquisition Regime? A Few Words of Caution, 37
TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 415 (Oct. 26, 1987) (critique of proposal for a carryover basis
election for qualifying asset acquisitions).
2. I.R.C. § 338 (treating certain stock purchases as asset acquisitions) (unless otherwise
indicated, all references to the Internal Revenue Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended and in effect for 1990).
3. Coven, supra note 1, at 176-81. But see Yin, supra note 1, at 419 (belief that one method
of uniformly taxing stock and asset acquisitions is dramatically more complex than other methods
is erroneous).
4. This article does not consider acquisitions governed by the reorganization provisions.
The reorganization provisions defer taxation on the gain or loss arising upon the disposition of
property when the property received in the transaction is viewed as a continuation of the original
investment. Thus, the reorganization provisions further the policy that gain or loss from a like
kind exchange shall not be recognized. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 14.01 (5th ed. 1987). Because the reorganization provisions address a policy concern that is different from the policies driving the recent
1.

FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C
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the substantive merit of a mandatory section 338 against its administrative complexity.
Part II of this article reviews the historic and current tax treatment
of taxable stock and asset acquisitions. Part III compares the current

proposals for reconciling the inconsistent taxation of taxable acquisitions. Part IV examines which stock purchases are the equivalent of
asset acquisitions. Part V develops guidelines concerning which transactions should be subject to a mandatory section 338, and part VI

addresses the operative rules of a mandatory section 338.
II.

TREATMENT OF TAXABLE STOCK AND ASSET ACQUISITIONS

A.

Before the Repeal of General Utilities

The General Utilities doctrine 5 was instrumental in Congress's historic efforts to remedy the inconsistent taxation of stock and asset
acquisitions. Prior to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in

1986, Congress attempted to achieve parity between the treatment of
taxable stock and asset acquisitions by adopting a system that conformed the tax consequences of an asset acquisition with the tax consequences of a stock acquisition.6
Before the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, 7 a stock acqui-

sition followed by a complete liquidation of the target corporation
triggered a single shareholder level tax." Upon the sale of stock, the

proposals for uniform taxation of taxable corporate acquisitions, enactment of such a uniform
system does not require amendment of the reorganization provisions.
Notably, however, a stock acquisition generally results in the same corporate level tax
consequences as an asset acquisition that meets the reorganization requirements. Yin, snpra
note 1, at 418. Accordingly, the proposal which treats qualified asset acquisitions as stock
acquisitions repeals the reorganization provisions and provides that only qualified asset acquisitions will receive reorganization treatment. Coven, supra note 1, at 190-91. In addition, commentators have argued that the reorganization provisions should be repealed under a mandatory §
338 regime. Id. at 190; Lewis, supra note 1, at 1045.
5. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). The term "General
Utilities doctrine" is used to refer to the nonrecognition treatment previously accorded to
corporations for certain distributions to shareholders and for certain liquidating sales. The rule
is reflected in former §§ 311, 336 and 337 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 311 governed
the treatment of nonliquidating distributions of property, whereas § 336 governed the treatment
of liquidating distributions in kind. Section 337 provided nonrecognition treatment for certain
sales of property pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation. See I.R.C. §§ 311, 336 (1982)
(amended 1986); § 337 (1982) (repealed 1986).
6. See generally B. BITTKER &J. EUSTICE, supra note 4, § 7.20 (discussion of pre-1987
law governing distributions of appreciated property).
7. See generally Bonovitz, Impact of TBA Repeal of General Utilities, 65 J. TAXN 388
(1986) (analysis of the effect of General Utilities).
8. I.R.C. § 336(a) (1982) (amended 1986); I.R.C. §§ 1001(a)-(c).
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selling shareholders recognized any realized gain or loss. 9 The target
corporation did not realize gain or loss from the shareholders' stock
sale, and the target corporation's basis in its assets remained unchanged.
When the target corporation distributed its assets in complete liquidation to the purchasing shareholders, the target corporation did not
recognize gain or loss.1° As a general rule, however, the purchasing
shareholders treated the liquidation as a sale or exchange of their
stock, and the purchasing shareholders recognized the entire amount
of gain or loss." Nonetheless, assuming that the stock purchase price
reflected the fair market value of the target corporation's assets, the
purchasers did not realize or recognize gain or loss upon the asset
distribution. Each purchasing shareholder received a fair market value
basis in the distributed property.' 2
In a parent-subsidiary liquidation, a purchasing corporation that
acquired 80 percent or more of the target corporation's stock did not
recognize gain or loss on the receipt of property distributed in complete
liquidation of the target corporation. '1 The parent corporation received
a transferred basis in the target corporation's assets. 14
Asset acquisitions produced different tax consequences. Generally,
two means to accomplish an asset acquisition exist. First, a target
corporation can distribute its assets to its shareholders in complete
liquidation. Before the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, a target
corporation that completely liquidated its assets did not recognize gain
on the distribution.' 5 The shareholders, nevertheless, recognized gain
or loss upon the distribution because the shareholders treated the
distribution as a sale or exchange of their stock.'6 The shareholders
received a fair market. value basis in the corporation's assets." The
shareholders could then sell the distributed assets to the purchaser
without realizing or recognizing further gain. The purchaser received
a cost basis in the assets.' 8

9. I.R.C. § 1001(a)-(c).
10. I.R.C. § 336(a) (1982) :amended 1986).
11. I.R.C. § 331(a); I.R.C. § 1001(a)-(c).
12. I.R.C. § 334(a).
13. I.R.C. § 332 (1982) (amended 1986).
14. I.R.C. § 334(b)(1).
15. I.R.C. § 336(a) (1982) ',amended 1986).
16. I.R.C. § 331(a).
17. I.R.C. § 334(a).
18. I.R.C. § 1012.
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Second, a target corporation can sell its assets to the purchaser
and distribute the sale proceeds to its shareholders. When a target
corporation adopted a plan of complete liquidation and distributed its
assets within the twelve-month period beginning on the date of the
adoption of the plan, the target corporation did not recognize gain
from the sale or exchange of its assets within the twelve-month
period. 9 The distributee shareholders recognized gain or loss upon
the distribution of the sale proceeds.20 Thus, regardless of whether
the corporation or its shareholders sold the corporation's assets, there
was only one tax at the shareholder level, and the purchaser of the
target corporation's assets received a cost basis in those assets.
The foregoing rules created an inconsistency in the tax treatment
of two otherwise similar techniques whereby a corporation acquired
another corporation. If a purchasing corporation acquired the assets
of the target corporation, then the purchaser received a cost basis in
those assets. 2' If a purchasing corporation acquired 80 percent or
more of the stock of a target corporation and subsequently liquidated
the target corporation, then the purchasing corporation received a
transferred basis in the distributed assets.To remedy this inconsistency, courts held that the purchase of
stock followed by a liquidation of the target corporation would be
treated for tax purposes as an asset acquisition. The purchasing corporation would thus receive a cost basis rather than a transferred
basis in the assets.2 This judicial doctrine is known as the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine. Congress subsequently enacted section 334(b)(2) to
effectuate the principles set forth in Kimbell-Diamond.- Section
334(b)(2) preserved the Kimbell-Diamond principles but added definite
rules prescribing the circumstances under which a stock purchase followed by a liquidation would be treated as an asset purchase.
Section 334(b)(2), a mandatory provision, was in effect from 1954
through 1982, when section 338, an elective provision, replaced it.26

19. I.R.C. § 337(a) (1982) (amended 1986).
20. See I.R.C. §8 331(a), 1001(a)-(c).
21. I.R.C. § 1012.
22. I.R.C. § 332 (1982) (amended 1986); § 334(b)(1).
23. See, e.g., Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), affid per
curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
24. S.REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4679. See also I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954) (amended 1986).
25. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954) (amended 1986).
26. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (96 Stat.) 324, 485. See also I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954) (amended 1986);
I.R.C. § 338.
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Section 338 provided certain purchasing corporations with an election
to treat a stock purchase as an asset purchase, and receive a fair
market value basis in the target corporation's assets.27 A purchasing
corporation which made the election treated the target corporation as
if the target corporation sold all of its assets for fair market value on
the acquisition date, and then became a new corporation which purchased the assets on the day after the acquisition. 2 The target corporation recognized neither gain nor loss on the deemed sale because it
satisfied the requirements of section 337, a statutory29extension of the
General Utilities doctrine, as in effect at that time.
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the disparities between the taxation of
acquisitions. However, it created strong tax biases which encouraged
corporations to participate in corporate acquisitions and reap the benefits of the excused corporate level tax, rather than realize gains in
the course of continuing business activities.3 0 This variation in the
taxation of corporate gains was one of the problems leading to the
1986 repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.'
B.

After the Repeal of General Utilities

The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine 32 disrupted the system
for reconciling the tax treatment of stock and asset acquisitions because it retracted the mechanism whereby a target corporation could
avoid the corporate level tax in an asset acquisition.33 Thus, since the
repeal of General Utilities, the Code imposes both an immediate cor-

27. I.R.C. § 338(a).
28. I.R.C. § 338(a).
29. See I.R.C. § 337(a) (1982) (repealed 1986).
30. When a target corporation realized the gain from its appreciated assets during an
acquisition, the pre-1987 Code excused the corporate level tax. I.R.C. § 336 (1982) (amended
1986). In contrast, the pre-1987 Code required a corporation involved in other realization events
to recognize that very same gain. See I.R.C. § 1001.
31. I.R.C. 99 311(b)(1), 336(a) (repealing the General Utilities doctrine).
32. I.R.C. § 311(b)(1), 336(a). Section 311(b)(1) provides that if a corporation distributes
appreciated property in a nonliquidating distribution, the corporation shall recognize gain as if
such property were sold to the distributee at its fair market value. I.R.C. § 311(b). Section
336(a) provides that gain or loss shall be recognized to a liquidating corporation on the distribution
of property in a complete liquidation as if such property were sold for fair market value. I.R.C.
§ 336(a).
33. See generally Silverman & Faber, General Utility's Repeal: A TransactionalAnalysis,
66 J. TAX'N 322, 323 (1987) (discussion of tax consequences of acquisitions after repeal of General
Utilities).
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porate level tax and an immediate shareholder level tax on an asset
acquisition followed by a liquidation of the target corporation."
In contrast to the dramatic reform in the taxation of asset acquisitions, Congress did not amend the Code with respect to the tax
consequences of stock acquisitions. Hence, a stock acquisition still
results in the immediate recognition of a shareholder level tax and no
corporate level tax consequences. Because a stock purchaser receives,
in effect, a transferred basis in the target corporation's assets, though,
the corporate level gain is merely deferred rather than excused.3
When the target corporation sells its assets or liquidates, the target
corporation will realize and recognize the appreciation which was inherent in its assets at the time of the stock acquisition.23 Thus, the disparity between the taxation of stock and asset acquisitions cannot be
fairly characterized as the difference between recognizing one level of
tax versus two levels of tax. Rather, the disparity results from the
timing of the realization and recognition of the corporate level tax.
An asset acquisition triggers immediate recognition of the corporate
37
level tax, whereas a stock acquisition allows deferral.
III.

PROPOSALS FOR REVISING THE
ACQUISITIONS

TAx TREATMENT OF

Concurrent with the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine,3 Congress instructed the Treasury Department to formulate proposals for
amending the current pattern of taxing corporate acquisitions39 The
Treasury Department has not presented guidelines for revising the
Code. Commentators, however, have generally recommended three
alternative approaches: a mandatory carryover basis for asset acquisitions, a carryover basis election for asset acquisitions, and a mandatory
4
section 338 for stock acquisitions. 0

34.
35.

See I.R.C. §§ 331(a), 336(a).
Yin & Mundstock, Corporate Tax Reform: A Report of the Invitational Conference oil

Subchapter C, 1988 A.B.A. TAx SEC. 104-05.

36. See I.R.C. §§ 311(b)(1), 336(a), 1001(a)-(c). In some instances, deferral of the corporate
level tax allows losses incurred after the acquisition to offset the built in gain at the time of
the acquisition. In these cases, the amount of the corporate gain, in addition to the timing of
the gain recognition, differs for stock and asset acquisitions. Lewis, supra note 1, at 1044.
37. See Yin & Mundstock, supra note 35, at 104-05.
38. See supra notes 31-32.
39. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 634, 100 Stat. 2085, 2282 (1986).
40. For a discussion of the commentators, see supra note 1.
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Mandatory Carryover Basis

A mandatory carryover basis regime would impose only one tax
at the time of all corporate acquisitions. The target corporation would
not recognize the corporate level gain or loss on the sale of corporate
assets at the time of a qualified asset acquisition, but the purchaser
of the assets would receive a transferred basis in the assets. To trigger
the shareholder level tax, the target corporation would be required
41
either to liquidate or to distribute the proceeds of the asset sale.
Under this proposal, the tax consequences of a qualified asset acquisition followed by a liquidation would be identical to the tax consequences of a stock acquisition.
Proponents of the mandatory carryover basis approach argue that
the system for taxing acquisitions must be mandatory rather than
elective because an elective system results in an unjustified reduction
in corporate income taxes. 42 Advocates of the mandatory carryover
basis approach believe that it is not possible to distinguish one level
of stock purchase from another; therefore, Congress cannot rationally
delineate those stock purchases which are the equivalent of asset acquisitions.43 Consequently, supporters of a mandatory carryover basis
system assert that Congress should tax all stock purchases uniformly."
Thus, to make consistent the tax consequences of stock and asset
acquisitions, Congress should tax qualified asset acquisitions in the
45
same manner as stock acquisitions.
B.

Carryover Basis Election

In contrast to a mandatory carryover basis system, a carryover
basis election would merely permit, rather than require, the affected
corporations in a qualified asset acquisition to defer the corporate level
tax.4 6 In addition, the affected corporations in a qualified stock purchase could elect to trigger an immediate corporate tax. 47 Thus, under
this proposal, corporations affected by an acquisition could choose

41. See Yin, supra note 1, at 424-25 (target corporation should be required to liquidate
rather than merely distribute the proceeds of the asset sale).
42. Coven, supra note 1, at 166-70.
43. Id. at 176-81.
44. Id. at 181.
45. Id. at 181-82.
46. ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 1, at 41-43.
47. Id. If a carryover basis election is made with respect to a qualified asset acquisition,
the target corporation would be required to distribute any proceeds from the sale of its assets
to its shareholders, and therefore, trigger a shareholder level tax. Id. at 73.
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between two alternatives: immediate recognition of the corporate gain
with a stepped up basis to the purchasing corporation, or deferral of
the corporate gain with a transferred basis to the purchasing corporation.48

Proponents of this approach, including the American Law Institute
(ALI)4 9 and the Senate Finance Committee Staff,50 assert that the
difficulties in requiring mandatory tax burdens for certain types of
acquisitions are insurmountable. Expressly permitting taxpayers to
elect their tax consequences while focusing on minimizing the abuses
under each of the alternative modes of taxation would therefore be a
51
better approach.
Proponents of the elective approach also note that a mandatory
carryover basis regime would raise substantial definitional problems
regarding which asset acquisitions would constitute qualified asset
acquisitions.5 2 The ALI argues that even though these same difficulties
would arise in an elective regime, an elective regime could resolve
the definitional issues "in a more arbitrary manner, since less purports
to turn on them."
C.

Mandatory Section 338

A mandatory section 338 regime would conform the tax consequences of a stock acquisition with the tax consequences of an asset
acquisition followed by a liquidation. Accordingly, the mandatory
section 338 approach requires that qualified stock purchases trigger
an immediate corporate and shareholder level tax. 5
Persons favoring this approach note that a mandatory section 338
would increase corporate tax revenues. 56 The corporate tax on the
previously unrealized appreciation would be paid at the time of the
stock acquisition, rather than deferred until the sale or distribution

48. Id. at 35-36, 40-41.
49. See generally ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 1.
50.

STAFF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE,

99th CONG., 1st SEss.,

THE

SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT OF 1985 51-52 (Comm. Print 1985).
51. ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 1, at 36.

52. Id. at 38.
53. Id. This reasoning is suspect because any asset acquisition which fails the definition of
qualified asset acquisition receives cost basis treatment under either a mandatory or permissive
system. Thus, it appears that there would be substantial motivation under either proposal for

an asset acquisition to satisfy the requirements of a qualified asset acquisition.
54.
55.
56.

See Yin, supra note 1, at 418.
Id.
See Lewis, supra note 1, at 1043.
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of the corporate assets as under current law. 57 A mandatory section
338 also requires the target corporation's shareholders to bear the tax
burden for the corporate assets which appreciated while the shareholders owned the target corporation's stock.- Under current law, a stock
acquisition is not a realization event for the target corporation. Therefore, a target shareholder can assign the corporate gain and the corresponding tax burden to any party who purchases the shareholder's
stock. 59
By requiring payment of the corporate tax at the time of the
qualifying stock purchase, a mandatory section 338 would prevent any
net depreciation in the target corporation's assets occurring after the
qualified stock purchase from offsetting a built in gain at the time of
the purchase6 ° For example, assume shareholder A owns 100 percent
of corporation X on Day 1. From Day 1 to Day 10, corporation X's
assets appreciate by $100, and shareholder A sells his stock on Day
10 to shareholder B for a price which takes into account the $100
appreciation in assets. From Day 10 to Day 20, corporation X's assets
depreciate by $100 and thus have the same value as on Day 1. On
Day 20, shareholder B sells his stock at a loss. Under current law,
the Day 1 through Day 10 corporate gain is netted with the Day 10
through Day 20 corporate loss, resulting in no corporate gain.61 A
mandatory section 338 requires shareholder A to pay tax on the gross
corporate gain on Day 10, and shareholder B is credited for the gross
corporate loss on Day 20.62 Thus, as under current law, there is no
overall net gain;63 a mandatory section 338, though, does not permit
the avoidance of taxation on the gross corporate gain.64
Opponents of the mandatory section 338 approach may argue that
such an approach causes or exacerbates liquidity problems for a target
corporation because the target corporation would have to pay the
corporate tax at a time when the target corporation is not receiving
cash. Furthermore, in many cases, the target corporation would have
to obtain an appraisal of its assets before it paid taxes on a deemed
sale of the assets, and such appraisals may be costly.

57. See Yin & Mundstock, supra note 35.
58. Lewis, supra note 1, at 1044-45.
59. Id. Presumably, the purchaser would pay less for the stock because of the deferred
recognition of the corporate gain. See id.
60. Id. at 1044-45.
61. Id. at 1045.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1044.
64. See id. at 1045.
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The ALI argues that the largest hurdle to enactment of a mandatory section 338 is the problem of fairly treating minority shareholders
whose stock is not acquired.6 The ALI states that it cannot justify
the immediate imposition or acceleration of the corporate level tax,
part of whose burden the nonparticipating shareholders bear, because
other shareholders have sold their shares.
Advocates of the status quo or other approaches also maintain that
a mandatory section 338 would be unworkable due to sheer complexity.6 A mandatory section 338 would provide a tremendous incentive
for stock purchasers to structure transactions so that their dealings
would fall outside the definition of a qualified stock purchase.6 7 Therefore, to prevent abuses, the drafters would have to formulate detailed
and intricate triggering rules.r Consequently, opponents of a mandatory section 338 conclude that a fairly drafted mandatory section 338
9
would be unduly complex.6
A final problem with a mandatory section 338 regime is that qualified stock purchases would always result in the immediate recognition
of gain or loss at the shareholder level.7° In contrast, an asset acquisition triggers recognition at the shareholder level only if the target
corporation liquidates or distributes the sale proceeds. 7 ' Time value
of money principles demonstrate that payment of a shareholder level
tax in the future is not equivalent to payment of a shareholder level
tax at the time of the acquisition.7 Thus, assuming that selling shareholders realize gain from the sale of their stock, the tax consequences
of a qualified stock purchase are less favorable than those of an asset
acquisition when the target corporation does not distribute the sale
proceeds.7 Of course, in many instances, a target corporation will
liquidate after an asset acquisition because the target corporation will
have sold most or all of its active business assets. Nonetheless, an
ideal mandatory section 338 should require a target corporation to

supra note 1, at 36-38.

65.

ALI

66.

Yin, supra note 1, at 419.

PROPOSAL,

67. See id.
68. Id.; Lewis, supra note 1, at 1044.
69. Coven, supra note 1, at 176-81.
70. I.R.C. § 1001(a)-(c).
71. See Yin, supra note 1, at 418.
72. See id. at 419; Yin & Mundstock, supra note 35, at 56.
73. Assuming that the target corporation does not liquidate and continues business operations, the tax paid by shareholders upon liquidation of the target corporation will be larger if
there is an accumulation of funds in corporate solution during the period of deferral.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

liquidate or distribute to the shareholders the proceeds from the asset
acquisition.
Under a mandatory section 338, a liquidation or distribution requirement for an asset acquisition would be very difficult to enforce
because there would be no incentive for target corporations to comply
with such a requirement. Perhaps, target corporations that failed to
liquidate or distribute the proceeds could be subject to some type of
"surrogate" shareholder level tax. Logically, though, when the target
corporation eventually liquidates or distributes the proceeds, such
liquidation or distribution should be tax free to the shareholders because the target corporation would have previously paid the shareholder level tax at the time of the acquisition. As a simpler alternative,
the surrogate tax could be a surrogate for only the delay in paying
the shareholder level tax, and not the tax itself; thus, subsequent
liquidations or distributions to shareholders would be taxable to the
shareholders.
The problem of how to require a target corporation to distribute
the sale proceeds from an asset acquisition would not arise under a
mandatory carryover regime. To attain a generally favorable result
(i.e., carryover basis treatment), the corporation would have to liquidate or distribute the sale proceeds. Accordingly, the target corporation
would have some incentive to comply with the liquidation or distribution requirement.
Under a mandatory section 338 system, a distribution or liquidation
requirement for asset acquisitions would require the drafting of a
second set of triggering rules. The second set of rules would be necessary to determine which asset purchases were qualified asset acquisitions, and thus subject to the requirement. Accordingly, the incorporation of a distribution or liquidation provision for asset acquisitions
in a mandatory section 338 system is not feasible.

IV.

STOCK PURCHASES WHICH ARE THE EQUIVALENT OF
ASSET ACQUISITIONS

Like current section 338, a mandatory section 338 would apply to
qualified stock purchases. The definition of qualified stock purchase
must be consistent with the policy underlying a mandatory section
338: simply, transactions which are not economically distinguishable
should not bear different tax consequences. If the definition of qualified
stock purchase fails to properly delimit those stock purchases which
are the economic equivalent of asset acquisitions, then the form rather
than the substance of the business transaction will dictate the tax
burdens of the parties.
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Under current section 338, a qualified stock purchase is defined as
a purchase of 80 percent of the total voting power of the target corporation's stock and 80 percent of the total value of the target corporation's stock. 74 Critics of the current requirements for a qualified
stock purchase have correctly argued that a definitional line drawn at
the point of 80 percent ownership often has no economic significance. 75
In other words, a purchaser acquiring 80 percent of the target corporation's stock could probably accomplish all desired business purposes
by acquiring 79.9 percent of the target corporation's stock. Accordingly, an 80 percent definition permits at least some taxpayers to elect
their tax consequences by restructuring their transactions to fall within
or without the definition of qualified stock purchase.
There is wide agreement that a purchaser who acquires 100 percent
of a target corporation's stock has acquired, from an economic or
business viewpoint, the equivalent of 100 percent of the target corporation's assets.7 6 Likewise, very few persons (if any) would maintain
that a purchaser who acquires merely 1 percent of a target corporation's stock has essentially acquired 100 percent of the target corporation's assets. Only those stock purchases which are equivalent to asset
acquisitions should be considered qualified stock purchases for purposes of section 338.
A purchaser of stock in a target corporation has essentially purchased the assets of a target corporation when the purchaser acquires
a controlling interest of stock. A purchaser who acquires control can
accomplish substantially the same results as a purchaser who acquires
assets because a controlling shareholder can exercise the shareholder's
will over all of the corporate assets virtually to the same extent as
if the shareholder personally owned those assets. 7 For example, absent a breach of fiduciary duty to minority shareholders, a controlling
shareholder has sole discretion to sell, mortgage, lease, distribute or
retain all of the assets in corporate solution.78 True, when the assets
or proceeds from the assets are removed from corporate solution, the
controlling shareholder is entitled to only a percentage of the assets
or proceeds. The relevant consideration, though, is not whether the

74.
75.
76.
77.

I.R.C. §§ 338(d)(3), 1504(a)(2).
Coven, supra note 1, at 179.
See id. at 174.
Cf. Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levein, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (controlling shareholder may

treat target corporation's assets as its own as long as the actions are in the corporation's best
interest).
78. See, e.g., Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359 (Mt. 1990) (majority
shareholder has a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders).
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stock purchaser has or will have legal title to all the assets. The
appropriate concern is whether the stock purchaser can make decisions
for the corporation in the same manner as if the stock purchaser
acquired all of the target corporation's assets and contributed them
to a newly formed corporation in which the stock purchaser was the
sole shareholder.
If the definition of a qualified stock purchase was based on an
acquisition of control in the target corporation, then the distinction
between stock acquisitions which are, and stock acquisitions which
are not, equivalent to asset acquisitions would have economic significance. For example, to avoid the application of section 338, a purchaser
would be forced to acquire less than a controlling interest in the target
corporation. Without a controlling interest in the target corporation,
the purchaser would not have sole authority to make decisions with
respect to all of the corporate assets. Hence, the term "qualified stock
purchase" should be defined as a stock purchase where the purchaser
acquires control of the target corporation.
V.

TRIGGERING RULES FOR A MANDATORY SECTION

A.

338

Qualified Stock Purchases

1. Proposed Definition of Control
There are two distinct approaches for defining when a shareholder
acquires control of a corporation. First, Congress could enact a subjective or "effective control" test.7 9 By adopting an effective control test,
Congress would implicitly acknowledge that in reality, the percentage
of stock ownership constituting control varies from corporation to corporation. If control was defined as effective control, then whether
section 338 applied would depend on a case-by-case, in-depth analysis
of the holdings of the target stock, including the formal and informal
relationships of the shareholders to one another.
The advantage of defining control as effective control is that such
a definition accurately describes the acquisitions to which a mandatory
section 338 should apply. One disadvantage of the subjective approach
is that many stock purchasers would be uncertain of the tax conse-

79. See H.R. 4646, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1(a)(i)(3)(C) (1990) (bill treating any hostile
qualified stock purchase by a foreign person as an asset acquisition and triggering section 338
if the purchaser acquired more than 50% of the voting power and 50% of the value of the target
corporation's stock, or "[t]he offeror has effective control of the corporation by reason of acquiring
such stock").
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quences of their transactions. 80 Moreover, the administration of such
a system would be very time consuming and costly.
Second, rather than adopting a subjective standard, Congress could
define control as the ownership of more than a specific percentage of
stock."' The advantages of this approach mirror the disadvantages of
the effective control approach. An objective test based on the ownership of a certain percentage of stock would provide taxpayers with a
higher level of confidence concerning the tax consequences of their
transactions. In addition, an objective approach would be easier to
administer than a subjective approach. The primary disadvantage of
an objective approach is that it would compromise the policy underlying a mandatory section 338 because of the administrative difficulties
of enforcing an effective control test. Nonetheless, the advantages of
an objective approach outweigh its disadvantages, and therefore, a
mandatory section 338 definition of control should be based on a percentage of stock ownership.
2. Control Defined as a Percentage of Stock Ownership
Congress has not enacted uniform definitions of control in the
Code . 2 The Code contains references to at least three definitions of
control.Y Section 304(c) defines control as "at least 50 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote,
or at least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of
stock. '"8 Section 368(c) defines control as at least 80 percent of the
outstanding voting power and 80 percent of the total number of all
other classes of stock.s Finally, section 1504(a)(2) defines control as
at least 80 percent of the voting power and 80 percent of the total

80. Of course, Congress could promulgate safe harbor rules to provide taxpayers with some
certainty regarding transactions which Congress believes would not result in the purchaser's
acquisition of effective control over the target corporation. However, each time Congress enacts
an objective standard or safe harbor rule, it compromises the policy served by an effective
control test, namely that stock acquisitions which are the equivalent of asset acquisitions should
be taxed as asset acquisitions.
81. Many other Internal Revenue Code sections use an objective standard based on stock
ownership rather than a subjective standard to effectuate the underlying policy of the Code
section. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 304, 368, 382.
82. Reilly, An Approach to the Simplification and Standardizationof the Concepts "The
Family," "Related Parties," "Control," and "Attribution of Ownership," 15 TAx L. REv. 253,
254 (1960) (tracing the development of these concepts in the Internal Revenue Code).
83. See I.R.C. §§ 304(c), 368(c), 1504(a)(2).
84. I.R.C. § 304(c)(1).
85. I.R.C. § 368(c).
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value of the shares of all classes of stock.8 6 The definitions vary, presumably, because the purpose of each section varies.
An analysis of the Code sections set forth above shows that at
least with respect to these sections, Congress has determined that a
provision which taxpayers may attempt to circumvent should be
triggered by a lower percentage of stock ownership than one which
reaps benefits to taxpayers.8 7 The application of section 304 usually
results in adverse tax consequences for shareholders. 5 Thus, shareholders may be motivated to avoid the 50 percent definition of control
set forth in section 304(c). In contrast, a shareholder who meets the
80 percent stock ownership requirements of sections 368(c) or
1504(a)(2) generally receives favorable tax treatment.8
In most instances, stock purchasers would not want to trigger a
mandatory section 338 and therefore would not want their stock purchase to meet the standards for control set forth in the definition of
qualified stock purchase.- An 80 percent stock ownership requirement
is not an appropriate definition of control for any provision which
results in adverse consequences to a purchaser. A stock purchaser
could easily subvert application of the section by purchasing less than
the required amount of stock.91 If the required percentage of stock is
less than 80 percent, then it is more likely that a stock purchaser
would have to acquire the required amount of stock to accomplish any
92
contemplated business purpose.
Furthermore, to prevent manipulation by stock purchasers, a triggering test for a section which reaps unfavorable tax consequences

86. Id. § 1504(a)(2).
87. See I.R.C. § 382; see also I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(H) (providing that "control" for purposes
of the definition of a nondivisive "D" reorganization is to be determined under § 304(c) rather
than § 368(c)).
88. Section 304 prevents a shareholder from bailing out corporate earnings and profits at
capital gains rates. See B. BIrIKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 4, § 9.12.
89. See I.R.C. H9 368(c), 1504(a)(2). If the reorganization provisions apply, the corporation
does not recognize gain or loss on the transfer of its property for stock or securities in another
corporation that is a party to the reorganization. Further, the shareholders and creditors may
exchange their stock or securities for new instruments without recognizing gain or loss. See B.
BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 4, § 14.01. If the common parent corporation meets the
stock ownership requirements set forth in § 1504(a)(2), then the affiliated group may elect to
file a consolidated return. Id. § 15.21.
90. If the target corporation owns assets with built in losses, then the purchaser may wish
to trigger § 338 to recognize the built in loss.
91. Lewis, supra note 1, at 1048 ("An 80 percent definition is functionally more elective
than a 50 percent definition.").
92. Id. (advocating the adoption of the 50% control test set forth in § 304).
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should contain a disjunctive rather than conjunctive definition of control. s Consequently, a mandatory section 338 should adopt a definition
of control similar to the definition set forth in section 304(c). Such
definition would provide that a purchaser acquires control of a target
corporation if the purchaser obtains greater than 50 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote,
or greater than 50 percent of the total value of shares of all classes
of stock.4

Unlike sections 304(c), 368(c), and 1504(a)(2), section 382 is not
triggered by a purchaser's acquisition of control. An ownership change
in the loss corporation triggers section 382.9- The two concepts often
overlap; however, they are not identical. For example, section 382 is
triggered when a 100 percent shareholder sells the stock through a
public offering to 1000 unrelated shareholders, none of whom acquires
as much as 5 percent of the stock, because the corporation has undergone a change in ownership.9 Nonetheless, the purchasers have not
obtained control of the corporation for purposes of section 338 because
there is no theoretical basis for attributing the stock ownership of the
one hundred unrelated shareholders to one another. Consequently,
section 382 is not the proper model for a mandatory section 338.
Moreover, if a mandatory section 338 had triggering rules which
were identical to the rules in section 382, then section 382 would have
little significance (except in the case of nontaxable acquisitions). Every
time there was an ownership change, section 338 would treat the loss
corporation as a new corporation on the day after the ownership
changeY Thus, the pre-change loss of the old loss corporation could
be offset only against the built-in gain of the old loss corporation which

93.

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 304(c)(1) (disjunctive definition of control).

94. Section. 304(c)(1) only requires that the purchaser obtain at least 50% of the total
combined voting power or 50% of the total value of all the outstanding shares of stock. I.R.C.
§ 304(c)(1). Because of a possible deadlock if the purchaser acquires exactly 50% of the stock,
§ 338 should require that the purchaser acquire more than 50% of the stock to ensure that the
purchaser acquires control over all of the corporate assets.
95. I.R.C. § 382(a), (d), (g), (k)(1)-(3). The policy supporting § 382 is that after an ownership
change, the new loss corporation should not be permitted to offset pre-acquisition losses against
the taxable income of the new loss corporation at a rate faster than the old loss corporation
could have absorbed such losses. H.R. REP. No. 98-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess 185, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4273.
96. See I.R.C. § 382(g). Under § 382(g)(4)(A) the interests of all less than 5% shareholders
are aggregated and treated as a single 5% shareholder. Because the hypothetical shareholder

(the group of new investors) has increased its stock ownership by 100 percentage points, a §
382(g)(1) ownership change has taken place.
97. See I.R.C. § 338(a)(2).
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was recognized under section 338(a). Of course, a mandatory section
338 that employed the section 382 triggering rules would greatly
simplify the taxation of corporations undergoing an ownership change
because the section 382 operative rules would apply less frequently.
3.

Special Rules to Determine Stock Ownership
a.

Stock

Section 338 does not expressly define the term stock, although the
definition of qualified stock purchase requires that the term "stock"
as used in section 338 must meet the requirements of section
1504(a)(2)."" Section 1504(a)(4) provides that certain preferred stock
should not be considered stock for purposes of section 1504(a) because
such preferred stock more closely resembles debt than equity.- To
carry out the purposes of section 1504, Congress granted the Secretary
authority to promulgate regulations which define the term stock.-°
The definition of "stock" set forth in current section 1504(a) should
be retained for purposes of a mandatory section 338. That way, a
definition of control based on a purchaser's percentage of the target
corporation's equity would exclude debt disguised as equity. ° 1 In addition, any regulations promulgated under section 382(k)(6)(B) "to treat
certain warrants, options, convertible debt interests, and other similar
interests as stock, and to treat stock as not stock,11 2 should apply to
section 338 as well.
The term "voting stock" should not include certain stock with limited voting rights. Stock which carries the power to vote only on
extraordinary matters, 0 3 stock with disproportionately small voting

98. I.R.C. § 338(d)(3).
99. I.R.C. § 1504(a)(4) provides:
For purposes of this subsection, the term "stock" does not include any stock which (A) is not entitled to vote,
(B) is limited and preferred as to dividends and does not participate in corporate
growth to any significant extent,
(C) has redemption and liquidation rights which do not exceed the issue price of
such stock (except for a reasonable redemption or liquidation premium), and
(D) is not convertible into another class of stock.
Id.
100. I.R.C. § 1504(a)(5).
101. Cf. Lewis, supra note 1, at 1050 (the term "stock" for purposes of a uniform corporate
level recognition approach includes only "[t]he class or classes of stock on which the impact of
the corporate-level tax would have fallen if the corporation had sold its assets, paid the resulting
tax, and distributed its remaining assets in liquidation").
102. I.R.C. § 382(k)(6)(B).
103. B. BITKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 4, § 3.07, at 3-28.
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rights, 0 4 or stock with contingent voting rights (unless the contingency
has occurred), 10 5 does not evidence a share of the control of the target
corporation. Without this qualification, a target corporation could manipulate the application of section 338 by issuing stock with extremely
limited voting rights so that a purchaser of 51 percent of the stock
with full voting rights would not be considered as acquiring 51 percent
of the voting power of all the voting stock.
b. Purchase
The section 338 definition of purchase essentially tracks the purchase definition in former section 334(b)(3). 06 Former section 334(b)(2)
only applied to purchases where the selling shareholder was taxed.
This was because, as noted previously, under prior law, stock acqui10 7
sitions and asset acquisitions resulted in one shareholder level tax;
former section 334(b)(2) provided that the purchasing corporation in
a stock acquisition would receive a cost basis in the target corporation's
assets just as if it had acquired assets rather than stock. 10 8 Accordingly,
former section 334(b)(2) only applied to stock acquisitions in which the
selling shareholders recognized gain because, in the absence of a shareholder level tax, it was appropriate for the purchasing corporation to
receive a transferred basis.
The definition of purchase in section 338 excludes the acquisition
of stock 1) with a transferred basis, 2) from a decedent, and 3) from
a related party under section 318(a)(1)-(3). 10 9 In addition, Congress
excludes from the definition of purchase certain stock acquisitions,
which, as to the selling shareholders, are not taxable events. 110
A third party's acquisition of target corporation stock with a transferred basis should not fall under the section 338 definition of purchase
because a third party's acquisition of the target corporation's assets
with a transferred basis would not cause the target corporation to
recognize gain or loss.- 1 Likewise, a beneficiary's acquisition of the

104. Id. at n.32.
105. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3(a)(3) (1960).
106. See I.R.C. § 338(h)(3) (defining purchase); I.R.C. § 334(b)(3) (1954) (repealed 1986)
(using substantially similar language).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 7-27.
108. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954) (amended 1986).
109. I.R.C. § 338(h)(3)(A).
110. Id. See Committee on Corporations of the New York State Bar Ass'n, Report on the
Temporary Section 338 Regulations 139-40 (1986) (proposing that stock received pursuant to a
convertible debt obligation should be considered purchased).
111. See I.R.C. § 338(h)(3)(A)(i)(I).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 3
698

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

target corporation's stock from a decedent shareholder should not
trigger section 338.112 Although a corporation cannot die and bequeath
its assets to beneficiaries, no policy is served by a rule which provides
that section 338 is not triggered by the transfer of stock by gift, but
is triggered by a transfer of stock upon a shareholder's death.
Furthermore, because some form of attribution rules should apply
to a mandatory section 338,113 an exclusion for stock received from a
related party would not be necessary for purposes of section 338, since
stock received from a related party would not increase the recipient's
percentage of stock ownership. Finally, stock received in nonrecognition transactions, such as reorganizations or transfers to controlled
corporations, should be excluded from the definition of purchase in
deference to the policies supporting the Code provisions relating to
such transactions.114
c.

Attribution Rules

Stock attribution rules thwart taxpayers' efforts to avoid the application of Code sections which are triggered by ownership of a specific
percentage of stock. As stated previously, most stock purchasers would
consider the consequences of a mandatory section 338 adverse. Hence,
rules governing the attribution of stock ownership must apply to determine whether a shareholder has purchased a controlling interest
in the target corporation.
The Code contains numerous attribution rules which share similar
substantive policies but which employ different technical provisions
for executing those policies.1 5 The various attribution sections also
specify different rules regarding the reattribution of stock. Although
6
an analysis of each attribution rule is beyond the scope of this article,,"
112. See I.R.C. § 338(h)(3)(A)(i)(I1).
113. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
114. See I.R.C. §§ 351, 354, 356, 358, 361-362, 368. Under a mandatory § 338 system, this
exception to the definition of purchaser would not be necessary if the reorganization provisions
were repealed, and only stock purchases which did not meet the requirements of a qualified
stock purchase would receive "reorganization treatment." See supra note 4 for further discussion.
115. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267(c), 318, 544, 958, 1563(e).
116. For more information, see generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 4, §§
9.03-.05 (discussion of constructive ownership, redemption, and liquidation of stock); Coven, The
Affinity Provisions of the IRC" A Case Study in Nonsimplification, 45 TENN. L. REV. 557
(1978) (discussion of how the Code treats various relationships between individuals); Loeb, What
Constitutes Ownership of Stock, 21 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 417 (1963) (exploration of
federal income tax meaning of stock ownership); Reilly, supra note 40 (critique of Code usages
of affinity terms and ownership concepts); Ringel, Surrey & Warren, Attributions of Stock
Ownership in the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1958) (analysis of stock
attribution concepts and their applications).
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it is clear that for purposes of triggering a mandatory section 338, in
some circumstances stock which is owned by one party should be
deemed to be owned by a related party.
d.

Voting Power

Because the definition of control should be based in part on the
ownership of a percentage of the total voting power of a target corporation's stock, shareholder voting agreements must be considered
when determining a shareholder's voting power. 117 This rule would
prevent a purchaser from avoiding the application of section 338. For
example, if shareholder voting agreements were disregarded, section
338 would not apply if a shareholder purchased full ownership of 48
percent of the target corporation's stock, and in addition purchased
the voting rights of 10 percent of the stock owned by other shareholders. In this situation, the shareholder would control all of the target
corporation's assets. Such an acquisition should be subject to section
338, even though the shareholder acquired absolute ownership of only
48 percent of the stock.
e.

Acting in Concert Rule

An "acting in concert" rule is an anti-abuse provision which prevents unrelated parties from avoiding section 338 by jointly acquiring
a controlling amount of the target stock. If two or more parties acquire
stock in a single transaction, 8 then such parties should be treated as
one qualified purchaser for purposes of determining whether such
qualified purchaser acquired a controlling interest in the target corporation. Absent such a rule, two individuals could agree to acquire
control jointly of a target corporation in a single transaction by each
purchasing 50 percent of the target corporation's stock, while avoiding
the application of section 338. In instances where informal groups of
individuals or entities will acquire control of a target corporation, a
mandatory section 338 should treat these informal groups as one qualified purchaser.
The acting in concert rule, however, increases the complexity of
a mandatory section 338. Such a rule is difficult to implement because
the beginning and ending point of a single transaction, and whether

117. See Hermes Consol., Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 398, 405 (1988). But see B.
4, § 3.07 (voting power should not take shareholder voting
agreements into account).
118. The step transaction doctrine would determine whether two or more parties acquired
stock in a single transaction. See 12 L. Fed. Inc. Tax'n (Callaghan) § 43.253 (1990).
BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note
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the parties acted in concert, are necessarily factual issues. In addition,
some critics of an acting in concert rule may be content to rely on
the attribution rules to ensnare "informal associations" and to allow
those groups falling outside the attribution rules to escape section 338.
4.

Twelve-Month Acquisition Period

Current section 338 provides that a purchaser has made a qualified
stock purchase only if the requisite percentage of stock is acquired
during the twelve-month acquisition period."19 The twelve-month acquisition period begins on the first day the purchaser acquires stock
120
which is included in the qualified stock purchase.
Congress should repeal the twelve-month acquisition period if section 338 becomes a mandatory provision. The rationale underlying a
mandatory section 338 is that the target corporation should recognize
gain or loss whenever a shareholder obtains control over all of the
target corporation's assets, whether such control is obtained by means
of a stock acquisition or an asset acquisition.121 Consequently, a mandatory section 338 should apply whenever a purchaser attains control
of the target, regardless of whether some of the purchaser's stock is
122
old and cold.
For example, assume that shareholder Z owns 45 percent of the
stock of corporation X and wishes to control the assets of corporation
X. To accomplish this goal, shareholder Z can either purchase 100
percent of the assets from corporation X or acquire 6 percent of the
X stock from the other shareholders. If shareholder Z purchases 100
percent of X corporation's assets, then X corporation will recognize
gain or loss on the disposition of its assets. Correspondingly, when
shareholder Z acquires 6 percent of the stock, X corporation should
recognize gain or loss as if X corporation has sold its assets.
From an administrative standpoint, a rule based on the acquisition
of control which does not consider when the shareholder purchased
the target corporation's stock is easier to implement than a rule which
is triggered by an acquisition of a certain percentage of stock during
a certain time period. Nonetheless, if Congress determines that an
acquisition period should be retained for a mandatory section 338,
then the acquisition period should be a three-year period.- If a man-

119.
120.
121.
122.
assets is
123.

I.R.C. § 338(d)(3).
I.R.C. § 338(h)(1).
See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
But see Coven, supra note 1, at 180-81 (tax on the entire appreciation in the target's
too severe a consequence for a minor stock purchase).
Section 382 contains a three-year testing period. I.R.C. § 382(i)(1).
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datory section 338 included a three-year rather than a twelve-month
acquisition period, shareholders would have more difficulty devising
transactions which intentionally bypass the definition of qualified stock
purchase.
5.

Amount of Outstanding Stock

A target corporation can manipulate the number and fair market
value of its outstanding stock through stock redemptions- and stock
issuances. Hence, stock redemptions and stock issuances must be taken
into account when determining whether the purchaser's acquisition of
the target corporation's stock satisfies the percentage ownership requirements of section 338.as If the definition of twelve-month acquisition period as set forth in section 338(h)(1) is retained for a mandatory
section 338, then the redemption or the issuance of the, target corporation's stock must occur during the acquisition period.
For example, assume that shareholder A owns all one hundred
shares of corporation X's only class of outstanding stock. Also assume
that section 338 is triggered when a purchaser acquires greater than
50 percent of the total voting power or greater than 50 percent of the
total value of shares of all classes of stock during a twelve-month
acquisition period. Shareholder B purchases forty shares of X stock
from shareholder A in year 1. In year 2, corporation X redeems forty
shares owned by shareholder A.
On the date of the stock purchase by shareholder B, the purchase
is not a qualified stock purchase because shareholder B acquired
merely 40 percent of the voting power and value of the X stock.
Shareholder B's purchase becomes a qualified stock purchase on the
M

124. See Treas. Reg. § 1.338-4T(c)(4) (1985) (redemptions from persons unrelated to the
purchaser during the acquisition period are taken into account when determining whether the
stock purchase satisfied the percentage ownership requirements for a qualified stock purchase).
125. Id. The need for this type of anti-abuse provision is not limited to patterns of taxing
acquisitions which are triggered by a "qualified stock purchase." Proposals which are triggered
by a definition of "qualified asset purchase" must adopt rules to prevent a target corporation
from dropping the desired assets into a subsidiary corporation so that the purchaser can acquire
100% of the subsidiary's assets and trigger § 338. Cf. Yin, supra note 1, at 422-24 (a carryover
basis election should only be available when a sale of the target corporation's stock in the
subsidiary corporation would not trigger a tax at either the target or subsidiary levels). Furthermore, in the rare situation when a target corporation wished to avoid triggering a mandatory
carryover basis, a mandatory carryover basis regime must develop rules preventing a target
corporation from bypassing § 338. The target corporation may try to borrow funds to purchase
additional assets prior to the sale of its assets or accept gifts from related parties to increase
the total amount of assets it owns and decrease the percentage of assets it transfers to the
purchaser.
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date of the redemption, though, because shareholder B's forty shares
then satisfy the percentage ownership requirements for a qualified
stock purchase (40/60 = 66%).
Alternatively, assume that shareholder A still owns the one
hundred shares of X corporation. X corporation issues one hundred
additional shares at a rate of ten shares each to ten purchasers who
are unrelated to shareholder A and one another. Subsequently, shareholder B purchases eighty shares of shareholder A's stock. Shareholder
B has not made a qualifying stock purchase because he has not purchased the requisite percentage of stock (80/200 = 40%).
B.

Qualified Purchasers

Current section 338 applies only to purchasing corporations.- As
explained previously, the elective provisions of section 338 replaced a
mandatory section 334(b)(2). 127 Former section 334(b)(2) provided that
a stock acquisition followed by a section 332 liquidation, like an asset
acquisition, would trigger one shareholder level tax. 1' In addition,
under former section 334(b)(2), the stock purchaser received a basis
in the distributed assets equal to the cost of the stock (with certain
adjustments).129 Section 334(b)(2), therefore, only applied to corporate
purchasers because only corporate purchasers could take advantage
of the section 332 liquidation provisions.130
Section 338, however, went one step further than its predecessor,
section 334(b)(2). If the purchasing corporation so elected, section 338
taxed any stock acquisition in the same manner as an asset acquisition,
regardless of whether the stock acquisition was followed by a liquidation.131 Because section 338 was an extension of section 334(b)(2), it
likewise only applied to corporate purchasers.
In 1986, the statutory environment in which section 338 operated
was drastically changed. Instead of ensuring avoidance of the corporate
level tax, a current section 338 election triggers the immediate imposition of the corporate level tax, as if the purchaser had acquired the
assets of the target corporation. 132 Because under current law an asset

126. I.R.C. § 338(a) (an S corporation cannot make a § 338 election under current § 338
because an S corporation as a shareholder is treated as an individual under I.R.C. § 1371(b)(2)).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29; see also Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982, supra note 26, at 485.
128. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954) (amended 1986). See supra text accompanying notes 15-25.
129. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1954) (amended 1986).
130. See id.; I.R.C. § 332(a).
131. See I.R.C. § 338(a).
132. See I.R.C. § 338.
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acquisition triggers a corporate level tax regardless of whether the
purchaser is a corporation or an individual, a mandatory section 338
should not be restricted to corporate purchasers but should apply to
all purchasers. 33
C.

Target Corporation

A mandatory section 338 should not apply to a target corporation
that is a subchapter S corporation because the corporate gains of an
S corporation are taxed solely at the shareholder level. 134 Accordingly,
it would be inconsistent with subchapter S to require recognition of
the corporate gain at the corporate level.
This rule is not necessary under current section 338. Section 338
applies when a purchasing corporation acquires stock of the target
corporation."' A target corporation which is an S corporation, however, cannot have a corporate shareholder. 36 Hence, a purchasing
corporation which purchases S corporation stock will terminate the
target corporation's S election. 37 If the proposals set forth in this
paper are adopted, then a mandatory section 338 will apply to all
purchasers. Thus, target corporations that are S corporations should
be exempt from the operation of a mandatory section 338.
VI.

SECTION

A.

338

OPERATIVE RULES

Amount of Section 338 Gain

Under present section 338, when a purchaser makes a qualified
stock purchase, the target corporation is treated as if it sold all of its
assets for fair market value on the acquisition date, and repurchased
those assets as a new corporation on the day after the acquisition
date. 38 Thus, when section 338 is triggered, the target corporation
realizes and recognizes the appreciation in 100 percent of its assets.
Under a mandatory section 338 regime, a qualified stock purchase
would include a purchase of only 51 percent of the target corporation's
stock. Nonetheless, a 51 percent shareholder can control 100 percent
of the corporate assets. 39 Hence, the target corporation should be
treated as if it sold all of its assets on the acquisition date.
133.
only to
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

But see ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 1, at 43 (proposed § 338 election would apply
purchasing corporations).
I.R.C. § 1366(a).
See I.R.C. § 338(d)(3).
I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(1)(B), 1362(a)(1).
I.R.C. § 1362(d)(2).
I.R.C. § 338(a).
See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 191 (2d ed. 1970).
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Consequences to NonparticipatingShareholders

When a purchaser makes a qualified stock purchase, applying section 338 may harm the nonselling or nonparticipating target shareholders. These shareholders are harmed to the extent that the target
corporation recognizes a gain on the phantom sale of its assets' 40 or
forfeits a portion or all of its net operating losses (NOLs). 4' , Although
section 338 causes the immediate recognition of gain, it also provides
some beneficial tax consequences to the purchaser and the nonparticipating shareholders. The target corporation's basis in its assets
increases by the amount of gain recognized by virtue of section 338.142
The increase in basis may result in increased depreciation and amortization deductions for the target corporation, and these deductions
may partially or wholly compensate the nonparticipating shareholders
for the immediate gain recognized at the time of the qualifying stock
purchase.
One way to ameliorate any perceived harshness to the nonparticipating shareholders would be for a mandatory section 338 to contain
a definition of qualified stock purchase which requires action by a very
high percentage of the shareholders. Such a definition, however, would
be very easy for purchasers to avoid, and also would not necessarily
draw a line distinguishing stock and asset acquisitions at a point of
economic significance, as explained previously.14
Another method for partially insulating the nonparticipating shareholders from the adverse impact of recognizing the corporate gain
would be for a mandatory section 338 to treat the target corporation
as if it sold only a percentage of its assets.' 44 The percentage of assets

140. See I.R.C. § 338(a); but see I.R.C. § 382(h)(1)(C) (gain recognized by reason of § 338
can be offset against the corporation's net operating losses in the year gain is recognized).
141. If net operating losses are close to expiring, then the application of § 338 may actually
produce a favorable result for :he nonparticipating shareholders because the NOLs may have
provided no benefit to the target corporation, and as a result of § 338, the target corporation
receives a stepped up basis. See I.R.C. §§ 172(b), 338(a)-(b).
142. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-4TOj) (1985). See generally B. BIrrKER & J. EUSTICE,
sapra note 4, § 11.48 (analysis of basis allocation for § 338); Bush & Mullaney, Basis Allocation
for a Target's Assets Under the New Section 338 Temp. Regs., 64 J. TAX'N 328 (1986) (review
of temporary regulations for I.R.C. § 338(b)).
143. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
144. Former § 338(c)(1) provided that if a purchasing corporation made a § 338 election,
acquired less than 100% of the target corporation's stock, and the target corporation was not
liquidated within one year after the acquisition date, the nonrecognition of gain or loss under
§ 337 was limited to the total gain or loss deemed realized on the sale of the target corporation's
assets multiplied by the largest percentage of stock owned by the purchasing corporation during
the one-year period following the acquisition date. I.R.C. § 338(c)(1) (1982) (repealed 1986).
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sold would equal the percentage of stock purchased. Hence, under
such a rule, Congress would require the target corporation to recognize
less than the full amount of its inside appreciation. When a purchaser
acquired 51 percent of a target corporation's stock, the target corporation would obtain an appraisal of all of its assets and recognize 51
percent of the unrealized appreciation in its assets. In addition, because
only 51 percent of the appreciation would be recognized, the target
corporation should receive only a partial step up in basis for its assets.
If Congress enacted a mandatory section 338 which required a
phantom sale of only a percentage of the target corporation's assets,
then the original (old) target corporation would retain a percentage
of its assets. Thus, the old target corporation should forfeit only a
percentage of its NOLs equal to the percentage of stock acquired by
the purchaser. This rule, however, would unduly influence business
decisions. A purchaser who would purchase more stock than required
to trigger section 338, if subject to neutral tax laws, would be well
advised to purchase only a controlling interest of the target corporation's stock. That way, the target corporation would trigger less gain
and forfeit a smaller percentage of its NOLs.
To completely shield the nonparticipating shareholders from the
adverse consequences of triggering a mandatory section 338, either
the selling shareholder or the purchaser must be liable for payment
14 5
of the corporate level tax, rather than the target corporation. 146
From an economic viewpoint, if a mandatory section 338 required the
selling shareholder to pay the corporate tax, then the selling shareholder would include the amount of the corporate level tax liability in
the purchase price of the stock. Thus, the purchaser would ultimately
provide the dollars which pay the tax. However, the selling shareholder would not always know whether the purchaser had acquired
or would acquire a controlling interest in the target corporation. Without this knowledge, the selling shareholder would not have all of the
relevant information for negotiating the selling price of his stock because he would not know that he should charge a premium equal to
the amount of the corporate tax liability. In addition, if the purchaser
made a creeping acquisition, it would not be possible for a selling
shareholder or any other party to know in year one what the amount

145. The party liable for the tax would have to establish the corporate level tax at the end
of the tax year. The target corporation would notify both the Internal Revenue Service and
the liable party of the amount of the tax liability for the appreciation in the target corporation's

assets.
146. But see Thigpen, supra note 1, at 204 (in all stock acquisitions, the corporate level
tax should be imputed to the selling shareholder).
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of the corporate tax liability would be in year three when the purchaser
acquired control of the target corporation. Requiring the purchaser
to pay the tax would solve these problems because the selling shareholder would not be forced to include the tax in his selling price.
A system which required a purchaser to pay the corporate level
tax would eliminate the problem of determining how numerous selling
shareholders would allocate the tax liability. However, it would create
the problem of determining how related parties whose aggregate stock
ownership resulted in the qualified stock purchase of the target corporation should share the tax burden. Presumably, all related parties
or parties acting in concert would share the corporate tax liability
based on their percentage of stock holdings. A sharing of the corporate
tax liability among related parties may appear inequitable, though, to
related shareholders who own a very small percentage of the stock
or whose stock ownership is old and cold. Such shareholders may not
have in fact participated in the decision to acquire control of the target
corporation. Any concerns regarding the possible unfairness to such
shareholders could be addressed by limiting the attribution and reattribution rules applicable to a mandatory section 338.
If Congress devises a rule which would partially or completely
shield the nonparticipating shareholders from the adverse impact of
recognizing the corporate level gain, then it must also formulate a
rule which would allocate the deductions resulting from the stepped
up basis solely to the purchaser. Such a system, however, would create
formidable difficulties. One answer would be to passthrough the depreciation or amortization deductions to the participating shareholders in
a manner similar to the operation of the passthrough provisions set
forth in subchapter K of the Code.'47 The passthrough provision would
be extremely complex to implement for corporations with many shareholders and would be contrary to our nonintegrated system of corporate taxation.
One argument against the need to allocate the deductions resulting
from the stepped up basis solely to participating shareholders is that
although the nonparticipating shareholders may benefit from the step
up in basis, the nonparticipating shareholders would be harmed to the
extent that the target corporation lost its NOLs due to the qualified
stock purchase. However, there is no connection between the amount
of the step up in basis and the amount of the target corporation's lost
NOLs, and consequently, such a rule would randomly over or under
compensate nonparticipating shareholders for the adverse impact of
the qualified stock purchase.

147.

See I.R.C. §§ 701-705.
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If Congress adopts a rule which requires a target corporation to
recognize only a portion of the unrealized appreciation in its assets,
then it must also formulate a special rule when a second purchaser
makes a subsequent qualified stock purchase. For example, assume
that X corporation's only asset is a piece of land with an adjusted
basis of $10, a fair market value of $110 in year one, and a fair market
value of $201 in year two. If shareholder A sells 51 percent of the X
stock to shareholder B in year one, then X corporation will recognize
51 percent of its built in gain [$51, or 51% of $100 ($110 fair market
value minus $10 adjusted basis)], and the amount of this gain will be
allocated to the adjusted basis of X corporation's asset.
If in year two, shareholder B sells the 51 percent of X stock to
shareholder C, X corporation should not be taxed on 51 percent of
the appreciation in X corporation's assets as of year two ($76.50 or
51% of $150 ($201 fair market value minus $61 adjusted basis)) because
shareholder C is in effect making a phantom purchase of the 51 percent
of the assets which were taxed in year one, rather than simply 51
percent of X corporation's total assets. X corporation should be taxed
on 51 percent of the difference between the value of X corporation's
assets on the date of the qualified stock purchase in year two and the
value of X corporation's assets on the date of the qualified stock
purchase in year one [$46.41 or 51% of $91 ($201 fair market value
minus $110 fair market value)].
Under a partial recognition rule, when a controlling shareholder
purchases additional stock, the corporate gain must be recognized.
For example, if shareholder C purchased 51 percent of the X stock
from shareholder B and subsequently purchased 19 percent of the X
stock from shareholder D, then X corporation should be taxed on the
51 percent described in the prior paragraph, and 19 percent of the
unrealized appreciation in all of X corporation's assets [$28.50 or 19%
of $150 ($201 fair market value minus $61 adjusted basis)].
C.

Consistency Rules

Section 338 contains two consistency rules which require a parent
corporation to use section 338 in the event of a qualified stock purchase. 148 Under a mandatory section 338 system, the consistency rules
would not be necessary because all qualified stock purchases, without
exception, would be subject to a mandatory section 338.149 The repeal

148.

I.R.C. § 338(e)-(f).

149. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on the Role of § 338 Consistency Rules
After Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine, Daily Tax Reports (Dec. 6, 1990) (consistency
rules unnecessary after repeal of General Utilities doctrine).
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of the consistency rules would be a significant step towards simplification of the current section 338.
D.

Qualified Stock Purchase of a Parent Corporation

Section 338(h)(3)(b) provides that if a purchaser makes a qualified
stock purchase of a parent corporation, then gain or loss at a level
below the parent corporation shall be recognized if the purchaser is
treated under section 338(a)(2) as purchasing the triggering percentage
of the subsidiary corporation's stock.150 This rule should be narrowed
for purposes of a mandatory section 338. Gain or loss at levels below
the parent corporation should be recognized only if the purchasing
corporation is treated pursuant to the stock attribution rules as purchasing a controlling amount of the subsidiary corporation's stock.
For example, assume that P purchases 60 percent of TC's stock,
and TC owns 60 percent of TC-I's stock. Using a 50 percent ownership
trigger, P has made a qualified stock purchase of TC but has not made
a qualified stock purchase of TC-1 because P is treated as owning 36
percent of TC-1. TC should not be deemed to have made a qualified
stock purchase of TC--1 simply because pursuant to section 338(a)(2),
it purchased 60 percent of TC-1 stock on the day following the acquisition date. 151 Such a rule would be inconsistent with the premise that
section 338 should apply only when the purchasing corporation controls
the target corporation's assets.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Provisions which generally result in adverse tax consequences,
such as a mandatory section 338, require extensive rules to prevent
152
taxpayers from controlling whether or not the provision applies.
Anti-avoidance rules are not necessary for provisions, such as a mandatory carryover regime, which usually grant favorable tax consequences to taxpayers. - Nonetheless, complexity is not the only relev-

150. Pursuant to § 338(h)(3)(B), a corporation that purchases stock is deemed to have
purchased all stock which is attributed to it by reason of the actual stock purchase. See also
Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(7) (1955) (parent corporation is deemed to have acquired the second-tier
corporation's stock by qualified purchase if it acquired at least 50% of the first-tier corporation's
stock by qualified purchase).
151. But see Temp. Tres. Reg. § 1.338-4T(c)(3) Q1 (under § 338(h)(3)(B), the deemed
purchase of 60% of TC-1 stock by new TC is a purchase by new TC for purposes of § 338(d)(3),
and thus constitutes a qualified stock purchase of TC-1 stock).
152. Yin, supra note 1, at 419-20.
153. Cf. 12 L. Fed. Inc. Tax'n (Callaghan) § 43.253 (1990) (anti-avoidance rule necessary
for mandatory § 338, as the result would be unfavorable to taxpayers).
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ant factor for determining the proper tax treatment of stock and asset
acquisitions. Drafters of tax legislation must weigh the often antagonistic goals of drafting legislation which is fair to both taxpayers and the
Treasury and which is not unduly complex.,"
While this article has illustrated that a mandatory section 338 is
indeed a complex provision, the query concerning the proper method
for taxing acquisitions does not end upon reaching that conclusion.
The real issue becomes whether the complexity of a mandatory section
338 is warranted in light of the fairness of the provision to taxpayers
and the government. Most arguments in support of imposing one level
of tax on acquisitions focus on the "unworkability of a two-level
scheme, rather than the fairness of such an approach."' 1 This article
illustrated that a mandatory section 338 can be applied in a rational
and fair manner. Such a proposal should be considered as an alternative
for providing uniformity in the area of acquisitions and should not be
dismissed from consideration because of "impossible" complexities.

154. Any proposal which allows taxpayers to elect the tax consequences which are most
favorable to them, and therefore, the consequences which are always least favorable to the
Treasury, abandons the notion that draftsmen should guard the interests of the Treasury.
155. Thigpen, supra note 1, at 186.
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